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Market and Welfare Eﬀects of Renewable Portfolio Standards
in United States Electricity Markets
Market Report
Livestock and Products,
Weekly Average
Nebraska Slaughter Steers,
35-65% Choice, Live Weight. . . . . . .
Nebraska Feeder Steers,
Med. & Large Frame, 550-600 lb. . . . .
Nebraska Feeder Steers,
Med. & Large Frame 750-800 lb. . .. .
Choice Boxed Beef,
600-750 lb. Carcass. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Western Corn Belt Base Hog Price
Carcass, Negotiated . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
Pork Carcass Cutout, 185 lb. Carcass
51-52% Lean. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Slaughter Lambs, wooled and shorn,
135-165 lb. National. . . . . . .
National Carcass Lamb Cutout
FOB. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Crops,
Daily Spot Prices
Wheat, No. 1, H.W.
Imperial, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Corn, No. 2, Yellow
Columbus, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Soybeans, No. 1, Yellow
Columbus, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .
Grain Sorghum, No.2, Yellow
Dorchester, cwt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Oats, No. 2, Heavy
Minneapolis, Mn, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Feed
Alfalfa, Large Square Bales,
Good to Premium, RFV 160-185
Northeast Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . .
Alfalfa, Large Rounds, Good
Platte Valley, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Grass Hay, Large Rounds, Good
Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .
Dried Distillers Grains, 10% Moisture
Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Wet Distillers Grains, 65-70% Moisture
Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
⃰ No Market
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Rising energy prices, dependence on foreign oil supplies, and alarming consequences of global warming
have prompted governments worldwide to initiate
green energy policies that can motivate a shift away
from fossil fuels and toward renewables for electricity generation. Recognizing the fact that around 40
percent of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions in the
United States come from fossil fuel combustion in
the electricity sector, several policies have been
adopted across states for reducing carbon emissions
and stimulating renewable energy development.
One of the innovative policy instruments that stands
out due to widespread adoption by states since the
late 1990s is the Renewable Portfolio Standard
(RPS). According to this policy, the electricity providers serving the end users in a state are required to
procure green energy (such as wind, solar, biomass,
or geothermal energy) for a portion of their electricity supplies.
To date, RPS has been a state-mandated program in
the United States with Iowa and Minnesota being
the first states to place minimum requirements for
renewable energy on their electricity providers in
1983 and 1994, respectively. Since then, the policy
has gained significant momentum and the adoption
rate continued to increase with time. As of August
2016, 29 states, Washington DC, and 3 territories
have adopted this policy while 8 other states and 1
other territory have renewable portfolio goals
(DSIRE, 2016). However, due to state-specific patterns of regulatory structure and other inherent
characteristics such as natural resource endowments, generation potential of green energy, and
political interest, there is considerable variation
among the states in RPS goals, coverage, and in-state
requirements.
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In addition to an array of state RPS programs already in
place, efforts have been made to advance a national RPS
policy. Several bills with provisions for federal renewable
electricity standards have been proposed since 2002. However, these bills have, so far, failed to become a law. While
the increased costs associated with mandating green energy
appear to be a key deterrent of a national RPS, in addition
to the benefits mentioned earlier, proponents of the policy
argue the existence of, in some cases, significant consumer
support that could ameliorate at least part of these costs.
With the growing trend on RPS adoption across the country, debates on the implementation of federal RPS, and the
potential for states to achieve the recently enacted Environmental Protection Agency’s Clean Power Plan (CPP)1 goals
using RPS, the resurgence in research attention devoted to
this policy has been anything but surprising.
Some recent studies have evaluated the economic effects of
the RPS introduction at the national level but none account
for the empirically relevant differences in consumer preferences for different types of energy, the potential for imperfect competition among the electricity suppliers, and the
links and interactions between the markets for regular and
green energy. Explicitly accounting for the links and interactions between these markets is particularly important due
to the coexistence of mandate-driven compliance markets
(where regular power2 containing a portion of renewables is
sold to the end users) with voluntary markets (where consumers purchase green power from their electric suppliers
on a voluntary basis)3. While the presence of these voluntary green markets demonstrates a consumer support for
renewables and can contribute to the passage of RPS, stringent RPS requirements can increase competition for renewable energy generation between the two markets (Bird and
Lokey, 2007). In this context, explicitly considering the
links and interactions of these markets is crucial in better
understanding the system-wide effects of RPS.

______________________

The new Clean Power Plan, proposed by the EPA in 2014 and
finalized in 2015, is the first federal policy to enact statespecific carbon emission limits. However, the future of the
CPP is uncertain under the current administration.
1

Regular power is defined here as the power generated from
fossil fuels such as coal and natural gas, nuclear energy, and
hydropower. With the implementation of RPS, the fuel mix
used to generate regular power contains a mandated percent of
renewables. Green power is the power generated from nonhydro renewable sources such as wind, solar, biomass, or geothermal.
2

3 As of 2011, over 860 utilities that cover more than half of U.S.
electricity consumers offer voluntary green pricing programs.
(Heeter, Armstrong, and Bird, 2012).

The objective of a recently published paper
(Bhattacharya, Giannakas, and Schoengold, 2017) is to
determine the system-wide market and welfare effects
of the introduction of RPS in United States electricity
markets. To analyze the economic effects of RPS, our
analysis develops a general theoretical framework of
heterogeneous consumers and imperfectly competitive
energy suppliers that takes into account both the supply and demand effects of RPS which include increased
costs (i.e., cost effect) and a higher consumer valuation
(i.e., utility effect) for regular power. Our work incorporates the possibility that green energy for RPS
(compliance markets) may be more expensive than
voluntary markets due to additional restrictions. It also
incorporates the possibility that mandated RPS may
lead to congestion in procuring green energy, which
will increase the cost of current voluntary green power
programs. While our analysis focuses on the market
and welfare impacts of the introduction of an RPS policy, the analysis (and results) are directly relevant to
cases where states with RPS increase the mandated
share of renewable energy in the regular power mix.
Our analytical results show the following:
Result 1: While the introduction of RPS increases the
price of regular power, the effects of the
policy on regular and green power quantities and green power price depend on the
relative magnitude of the cost and utility
effects, the strength of consumer preference
for green power, the supplier costs before
RPS, and the degree of competition among
suppliers in the two power markets.
Result 2: The introduction of RPS can reduce the total quantity of green power used in electricity production. This adverse policy impact
will occur when the inclusion of a relatively
small share of renewables in the regular
power mix (mandated by RPS) generates a
significant consumer response (strong utility effect) and/or a small increase in the costs
of regular power (weak cost effect).
We use a simulation based on estimated costs of electricity generating facilities, fuel costs, and the value
consumers place on green energy to determine the
most likely effects of adopting RPS policies by those
states that do not currently have one. We compare outcomes under constant and increasing costs of green
power, and we evaluate two sources of green energy
(wind and solar). The percent of renewables mandated
is generally between 10 and 30 percent (DSIRE
2016), ), so we use 20 percent for the simulation analy-

sis. Our analysis also incorporates a small amount of market power in both the green and regular electricity markets.
Due to the relatively high cost, it is unlikely that RPS requirements will be met using solar energy. Thus, we focus
on the results that use wind power to meet the mandate in
our discussion. We find that the post-RPS price of regular
power increases by 0.21 to 0.5 cents per kWh
(approximately 5 to 10 percent) when the mandate is
achieved using wind energy. When green power costs are
unchanged after RPS, we find an increase of 2 to 6 percent
in the total amount of renewable energy used. However, if
green power costs increase under RPS due to congestion,
total renewable energy use could decrease by up to 10 percent. The reason for the decrease in total renewable energy
use under certain scenarios is that an increased cost for voluntary green energy may lead to some consumers shifting
from the green to the regular market.
Our results show that the most likely scenario in areas with
no congestion in renewable energy availability is an increase in the quantity of green power and an increase in the
price of regular power. Under this scenario, there is an increase in welfare for green consumers. This is consistent
with many consumers not supporting RPS policies. With
this outcome, firm profits in both markets can decrease, a
result that is consistent with a lack of industry support for
RPS. Thus, under plausible scenarios, RPS policies can be
successful in achieving the primary goal of the policy (i.e.,
increasing the use of renewable and decreasing the use of
conventional energy sources). Areas that are likely to have
congestion for renewable energy sources are more likely to
observe an increase in consumer welfare because of the
utility effect and an increase in the profit of regular firms.
Thus, it is likely that RPS policies will have considerable
political support in these cases. However, results show that
the effect may actually be a net decrease in renewable energy, which is contrary to the primary goal of RPS. In such
cases, there may be real economic benefits of RPS but little
(if any) environmental benefits.
Our study also shows that the policy design can play a key
role in determining the effects of the policy when the costs
and consumer attitudes vary, as they normally do, across
the different alternatives. For instance, the cost effect of
RPS requirements may be lower in a non-RPS state with
plentiful wind energy (e.g., Nebraska) than in one with limited sources of wind energy (e.g., West Virginia). In the first
case, underutilized wind energy capacity may result in no
change in the cost of green power after RPS while the second case is more likely to lead to an increase in the cost of
green power. The results can provide insights on the political economy of RPS and the positions held by different
groups in policy negotiations. Obviously, whether a certain
state falls under a particular scenario or not is an empirical
question worthy of further research.
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